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....................................... BENNETTL.GERSHMAN* 
White Plains 
Reflections on 
Client Perjury 
M ost experienced prosecu-tors, judges, and defense attorneys would pro-
bably agree that perjury in the 
criminal justice system occurs often. 
Although the frequency of perjury 
has never empirically been 
demonstrated, it is not surprising 
that with so much at stake, prosecu-
tion and defense witnesses would be 
tempted to fabricate testimony to 
meet the exigencies of the case. 
Detecting and dealing with per-
jurious testimony, however, is 
another matter. Implicated are com-
plex legal and ethical problems for 
both prosecutors and defense at-
torneys.l The judiciary's response to 
these problems, moreover, has 
largely been formalistic, without 
enunciating sufficiently clear stan-
dards to guide future behavior. 
For example, prosecutorial 
tolerance, and even active suborna-
tion of perjury, usually is analyzed 
objectively for its impact on the 
factfinder's evaluation of the 
evidence, rather than focusing sub-
jectively on the prosecutor's 
willfulness or bad faith. 2 Clearly, 
for purposes of remedying pro-
secutor misconduct in the future, 
such a response is wholly unsatisfac-
tory. That issue, however, is a sub-
ject for another essay. The present 
discussion concerns the extent to 
which a criminal defense attorney 
legally and ethically may cooperate 
with his or her client in concealing 
the truth. 
Plainly, in protecting his client's 
interests, defense counsel's commit-
ment to truth can vary greatly. At 
one extreme, of course, are acts 
deliberately designed to conceal the 
truth, such as secreting evidence, 
fabricating defenses, and suborning 
perjury.3 Such conduct can never be 
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Pace Universi-
ty. 
1 See G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW (1978); J. BURKOFF, 
CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS - LAW AND 
LIABILITY (1986); B. GERSHMAN, PRO-
SECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (1985). 
2 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 
(1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 
(1972). 
3 See, e.g., Clutchette v. RUj;ken, 770 F.2d 
1469 (9th Cir. 1985); In re January 1976 
Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1976); In 
re Ryder, 263 F.Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967), 
affd, 381 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1967); Thornton 
v. United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C. App.), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976); In re 
Branch, 449 P.2d 174, 74 Cal. Rptr. 238 
(1969); In re Rosenberg, 27{j App. Div. 268, 
93 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1950). . 
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justified or condoned. At the other 
extreme are options which 
legitimately permit suppression of 
the truth. These include, for in-
stance, advising a client to refuse to 
testify or comply with a subpoena 
ordering the production of records, 
pursuant to a valid claim of 
privilege. 4 Between these ethical and 
legal extremes, however, are more 
nebulous situations, such as "advis-
ing" a client of the legal conse-
quences of possessing certain 
documents, or suggesting the 
availability of "hypothetical" 
defenses, knowing full well that the 
client will engage in conduct or 
tailor his story to mesh with that ad-
vice.s Given the adversary system, 
in which "winning" can overshadow 
the quest for truth,6 extremely com-
plex questions arise: Is a criminal 
defense lawyer required to play the 
dual roles of loyal "champion" of 
his client, and "gatekeeper" of the 
temple of justice? Are these roles 
really compatible? If so, what are 
the rules of the game? 
Consider in this connection 
perhaps the most difficult question 
of all: How far, if ever, can a 
criminal defense lawyer cooperate 
in his or her client's decision to com-
mit perjury? Courts,7 commen-
tators, g and bar committees9 have 
grappled with this question for 
years without offering clear or con-
sistent guidelines. Any principled 
response, however, must take into 
account some very hard questions. 
Under what circumstances, for in-
stance, does the lawyer ever really 
"know" that his client's proposed 
testimony is false? Is it sufficient if 
the lawyer simply disbelieves his 
client's story, or that of his client's 
witnesses?9. Does it make any dif-
ference if the attorney learns of the 
plan during the trial, as opposed to 
prior to the trial? What actions can 
the lawyer properly take when he 
believes that his client intends to 
commit perjury? Is the prevention' 
of perjury more important than 
loyal and aggressive representation? 
Can the lawyer simply remain 
silent, and passively permit the per-
jury to occur? Can he threaten to 
impeach his client's testimony? 
Withdraw from the case? Report his 
client's actions to the judge? 
Last Term, in Nix v. Whiteside,lO 
the Supreme Court for the first time 
addressed several of these questions. 
The Court unanimously agreed, 
under the facts of the case, that the 
lawyer's refusal to assist his client's 
plan to commit perjury did not 
deprive the defendant of his Sixth 
Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel, nor of his 
right to testify in his own defense. l1 
A majority of the Court essayed the 
ethical questions as well, and in 
obiter dicta, concluded that "under 
no circumstances may a lawyer 
either advocate or passively tolerate 
a client's giving false testimony."12 
The majority went further, 
however, and formulated specific 
rules of permissible and impermissi-
ble attorney behavior. 
The facts were uncomplicated. 
Whiteside was tried in an Iowa state 
court for stabbing to death a friend, 
Love, following an argument over 
drugs. One of the principal issues 
was whether the killing was in self-
defense. During pretrial prepara-
tion, Whiteside consistently told his 
court-appointed counsel that he had 
not actually seen a gun in the 
deceased's hand. About a week 
before trial, however, he changed 
his story, stating that he had seen 
4 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 
(1976); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 
547 (1892). 
s See ABA MODEL CODE DR 
7-102(A)(7)("in his representation of a client, 
a lawyer shall not . . . counselor assist his 
client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be 
illegal or fraudulent"); ABA MODEL RULE 
1.2(d)("a lawyer may discuss the legal conse-
quences of any proposed course of conduct 
with a client and may assist a client to make a 
good faith effort to determine the validity, 
scope, meaning or application of the law"). 
The Commentary to MODEL RULE 1.2(d) 
states: "There is a critical distinction between 
presenting an analysis of legal aspects of 
questionable conduct and recommending the 
means by which a crime or fraud might be 
committed with impunity." 
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6 See Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: 
Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? 1963 
Wash. U. L. Q. 279, 292. 
7 Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986) 
(lawyer must withdraw or disclose intended 
perjury); Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 
(9th Cir. 1978) (withdrawal request 
predicated on client perjury in middle of 
bench trial denied client fair trial); United 
States ex reI. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 
(3d Cir. 1977) (attorney's disclosure to judge 
of client's intended perjury has chilling effect 
on effective representation). 
8 Rieger, Client Perjury: A Proposed 
Resolution of the Constitutional and Ethical 
Issues, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 121 (1985); Callan 
and David, Professional Responsibility and 
the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of 
Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 
29 Rutgers L. Rev. 332 (1976); Freedman, 
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal 
Defense Lawyer; The Three H,.rdest Ques-
tions, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1469 (1966). 
9 ABA MODEL RULES 1.2(d), 3.3(c); ABA 
MODEL CODE, DR 7-102(A)(4), DR 
7-102(A)(7); ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 4-7.7 (2d ed. 1980); 
AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYER'S ASSOCIA-
TION CODE, Rule 1.2 (1980). The ATLA 
Code contains no specific rule on client per-
jury since the entire matter is subsumed under 
Rule 1.2 relating to strict attorney confiden-
tiality regarding client perjury. 
9. A threshold question in considering client 
perjury is the extent to which a lawyer must 
be convinced that his client intends to commit 
perjury. It is rare when the lawyer really 
"knows" that his client intends to commit 
perjury. See Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 
(1986). Clearly, a lawyer must have a firm 
factual basis for believing that his client in-
tends to commit perjury. A hunch, or 
speculation, is insufficient to trigger an 
ethical duty. See United States ex rei. Wilcox 
v, Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cit. 1977). 
Under the Model Rules, a lawyer may refuse 
to offer evidence that the lawyer "reasonably 
believes" is false. Model Rule 3.3(c). Some 
commentators recommend a more rigorous 
standard of attorney belief. See Rieger, Client 
Perjury: A Proposed Resolution of the Con-
stitutional and Ethical Issues, 70 Minn. L. 
Rev. 121, 149 (1985) (recommending stan-
dard of belief "beyond a reasonable doubt"); 
ABA Formal Opinion 314 (1965) (lawyer 
should disclose client confidences if lawyer is 
convinced "beyond a reasonable doubt" that 
a crime will be committed). 
10 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986). 
11 The Supreme Court has never explicitly 
held, but has consistently assumed, that a 
criminal defendant has a due process right to 
testify in his own behalf. rd, at 993. See Jones 
v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983); Brooks v. 
Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972); Harris v. 
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
12 106 S. Ct. at 996. The extent to which a 
lawyer may stand mute, and permit his client 
to testify in a free narrative fashion, is one of 
the most controversial issues relating to client 
perjury. See note 19, infra. 
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"something metallic" in Love's 
hand, and that "If I don't say I saw a 
gun I'm dead." Whiteside's attorney 
warned him that if he so testified, he 
would advise the court of the defen-
dant's proposed perjury, seek to 
withdraw from the case, and at-
tempt to impeach his client's 
testimony. Whiteside testified, 
stating that he "knew" Love had a 
gun but had not actually seen a gun 
in Love's hand. After the jury 
returned a murder verdict, 
Whiteside moved for a new trial, 
contending that his lawyer's ad-
monition not to state that he saw 
"something metallic" denied him a 
fair trial. After a hearing, the trial 
court denied the motion and the 
Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, 
holding that an attorney's duty to 
his client does not extend to 
assisting the commission of perjury. 
Whiteside then petitioned the 
federal district court for a writ of 
habeas corpus, alleging that his 
counsel's actions denied him effec-
tive assistance of counsel and the 
right to present his defense. The 
district court denied the writ but the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed.13 The court found that 
although a criminal defendant's 
privilege to testify does not include 
a right to commit perjury, counsel's 
admonition that he would inform 
the court of the planned perjury 
constituted a threat to violate an at-
torney's duty to preserve client con-
fidences and as such, breached the 
standards of effective representation 
laid down in Strickland v. 
Washington. 14 
The Supreme Court reversed, 
and reinstated the conviction. Every 
Justice agreed that Whiteside had 
not been denied effective representa-
tion under the Strickland test, which 
requires a defendant to show that 
counsel committed such serious pro-
fessional errors as to undermine 
confidence in the outcome of the 
trialY An attorney's duty to his 
client, five Justices wrote for the ma-
jority, is limited to legitimate con-
duct, and does not include assisting 
32 
his client in presenting false 
evidence. 
Although not required to, the 
majority discussed what it believed 
were appropriate ethical responses 
for lawyers faced with client per-
jury. The attorney initially should 
attempt to dissuade his client from 
his unlawful plan.16 If that course is 
unsuccessful, the attorneY is 
obligated to reveal his client's con-
duct to the court, 17 and even seek to 
withdraw from the case.18 Under no 
circumstances, the majority em-
phasized, should the lawyer either 
assist, or even passively permit, his 
client giving false testimony.19 
Moreover, counsel's threat to reveal 
Whiteside's perjury and withdraw 
13 Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 
1984). 
14 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
15 466 U.S. at 667-668. The Court in 
Strickland emphasized that a claim of ineffec-
tiveness has two components. First, a defend-
ant must show that counsel's performance 
was "deficient" in that he "made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment." Second, the defendant 
must show that he was prejudiced, in that 
"counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendallt of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable." 
16 "It is universally agreed that at a minimum 
the attorney's first duty when confronted 
with a proposal for perjurious testimony is to 
attempt to dissuade the client from the 
unlawful course of conduct." 106 S. Ct. at 
996. See ABA Informal Opiniori 1314 (1975); 
ABA MODEL RULE 3.3, Comment (1983). 
17 The Court stated: "Indeed, both the Model 
Code and the Model Rules do not merely 
authorize disclosure by counsel of client per-
jury, they require such disclosure," 106 S. Ct. 
at 995 (emphasis in original). This is not 
altogether correct. The Model Rules appear 
to require disclosure only after the client has 
given false testimony. See ABA MODEL 
RULE 3.3, Comment (1983). Moreover, the 
Model Code appears to allow, but does not 
require, an attorney to reveal his client's in-
tention to commit perjury. See ABA MODEL 
CODE, DR 4-101(C)(3). Nor is the Court's 
reliance on DR 7-102(B)(1) correct, since that 
provision concerns a lawyer's obligation 
when faced with a client who has already 
committed perjury. The courts are equally 
unclear. Compare State v. Henderson, 468 
P.2d 136 (Kan. 1970); State v. Robinson, 224 
S.E.2d 174 (N.C. 1976); People v. Salquerro, 
433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1980), with United States 
ex reI. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d 
Cir. 1977); Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 
844 (D.C. App. 1980). Moreover, disclosure 
may impinge on the attorney-client confiden-
tial relationship, see ABA MODEL CODE 
DR 4-101, as well as the defendant's right to a 
fair trial. United States ex reI. Wilcox v. 
Johnson, supra. 
18 ABA Informal Opinion 1314 (1975); ABA 
MODEL RULE 3.3, Comment (1983). Several 
courts require the attorney to withdraw upon 
learning of a client's intention to commit per-
jury. See Newcomb v. State, 651 P.2d 1176 
(Alaska App. 1982); In re Palmer, 252 S.E.2d 
784 (N.C. 1979); People v. Blye, 223 Cal. 
App. 2d 143, 43 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1965). A 
withdrawal motion probably will be denied if 
counsel refuses to disclose to the court the 
basis for the motion. See United States v. 
Henkel, 799 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1986); People 
v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1981); People 
v. Salquerro, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1980). See 
also Erickson, The Perjurious Defendant: A 
Proposed Solution to the Defense Lawyer's 
Conflicting Obligation to the Court and His 
Client, 59 Den. L. J. 75 (1981). 
19 Prior to Whiteside, the approach most 
widely accepted by the courts was the free 
narrative, whereby an attorney who believed 
that his client would testify falsely would first 
inform the court that he advised his client not 
to testify, and then remain mute while the 
defendant gave his testimony, without con-
ducting any examination, or arguing the 
testimony to the jury. See Burger, Standards 
of Conduct: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 Am. 
Crim. L. Q. 11, 13 (1966); ABA STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 4-7.7 
(2d Ed. 1980). See also United States v. 
Campbell, 616 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir. 1980); 
Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 
1978); Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844 
(D.C. App. 1980); Sanborn v. State, 474 
So.2d 309 (Fla. App. 1985); State v. Fosnight, 
679 P.2d 174 (Kan. 1984); In re Goodwin, 305 
S.E.2d 578 (S.c. '1983); People v. Salquerro, 
433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1980). 
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from the case were in-
distinguishable, according to the 
majority, from disclosing client 
misconduct such as tampering with 
witnesses or jurors.20 "In short, the 
responsibility of an ethical lawyer, 
as an officer of the court and a key 
component of a system of justice, 
dedicated to a search for truth, is 
essentially the same whether the 
client announces an intention to 
bribe or threaten witnesses or jurors 
or to commit or procure perjury. No 
system of justice worthy of the 
name can tolerate a lesser 
standard. "21 
Four Justices concurred in the 
result, but would have limited their 
consideration to the constitutional 
questions involved, and resisted the 
invitation to enter this "thorny" and 
"controversial" area, and formulate 
rigid rules of professional conduct 
for attorneys. Under the Strickland 
test, however, since Whiteside had 
no constitutional right to his 
counsel's assistance in committing 
perjury, nor counsel's silence about 
the plan, no violation occurred. 
That is not to say, emphasized the 
concurring Justices, that a Sixth 
Amendment violation could not be 
shown in other related cir-
cumstances. This might depend on 
the level of the attorney's certainty 
about the proposed perjury; the 
stage of the proceedings at which 
the attorney discovers the plan; or 
the methods used by the attorney to 
try to dissuade his client. The con-
curring Justices cautioned, however, 
that attorneys who adopt "the role 
of the judge or jury to determine the 
facts pose a danger of depriving 
their clients of the zealous and loyal 
advocacy required by the Sixth 
Amendment. "22 
Nix is a troubling decision. As a 
jurisprudential matter, the case is a 
peculiar blend of constitutional doc-
trine and legal morals. The holding 
is fairly narrow; the dicta is ex-
tremely broad. Essentially the Court 
emphasized, as it has on many 
previous occasions, that perjury is 
obnoxious to the justice system,23 
and announced for the first time 
that a lawyer's refusal to cooperate 
in his client's plan to lie does not 
under the circumstances render the 
lawyer ineffective under the Sixth 
Amendment. This was predictable. 
Wholly unpredictable, however, 
was the Court's willingness to enter 
the ethical twilight zone of attorney-
client interaction, and promulgate a 
code of attorney behavior in the 
context of client perjury. 
Several points are notable. First, 
this excursion into defense lawyer 
ethics stands in sharp contrast to the 
Court's historic unwillingness to im-
pose ethical rules for prosecutors or 
other government officials. The 
Court recently wrote: "Nothing in 
the Constitution vests in us the 
authority to mandate a code of 
behavior for state officials. "24 
Similarly, the Court observed: 'The 
Due Process Clause is not a code of 
ethics for prosecutors. "25 And in one 
recent case in which a prosecutor 
engaged in outrageous misconduct,26 
the Court, after issuing a few 
paragraphs of mild reproach, con-
cluded: "[Defendant's} trial was not 
perfect - few are --'- but neither was 
it fundamentally unfair ."27 In that 
case - Darden v. Wainwright -
the prosecutor characterized the 
defendant as an "animal;" told the 
jury that the only guarantee against 
his future crimes would be to ex-
ecute him; that he should have "a 
leash on him;" and should have "his 
face blown away by a shotgun." It 
became the function of the four 
dissenting Justices to outline pain-
fully the numerous ethical rules 
which the prosecutor violated. And 
ironically, in cases involving pro-
secutorial subornation of perjury 
and suppression of evidence, the 
Court has carefully avoided ethical 
condemnations, stating: "Nor do we 
believe the constitutional obligation 
is measured by the moral culpabili-
ty, or willfulness, of the pros-
ecutor. "28 Unevenhanded ethical 
jurisprudence promotes cynicism 
and disrespect, and can even en-
courage further government mis-
NEW YORK STATE BAR JOURNAL October 1987 
conduct. 29 Aggravating the concerns 
over such disparate treatment, of 
course, is the overriding legal and 
ethical precept that it is the pro-
secutor's obligation, rather than 
that of defense counsel, "not that it 
shall win a case, but that justice 
shall be done."30 
Moreover, Nix v. Whiteside, as 
with other decisions involving the 
role of counsel for indigent defen-
dants, continues a trend which 
threatens to undermine the fierce 
and dedicated representation to 
which such defendants are constitu-
tionally entitled. Just as it is virtual-
ly inconceivable, for example, that a 
privately retained lawyer would 
ever file on appeal an "Anders brief" 
alleging no meritorious issue,31 it is 
equally inconceivable that a private-
ly retained lawyer would threaten to 
impeach his client's proposed 
testimony, or report his conduct to 
the judge. It is hardly surprising that 
virtually all of the decisions dealing 
20 Preventing a client from tampering with 
witnesses or jurors arguably stands on an en-
tirely different footing than threatening to ex-
pose a client's own false testimony. 
Testimony by a defendant is inextricably con-
nected with constitutional considerations; no 
such considerations apply to the corruption 
of witnesses or jurors. 
21 106 S. Ct. at 998. 
22 106 S. Ct. at 1006. 
23 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (197l); 
Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969; 
United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969); 
United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937). 
24 Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1143 
(1986). 
25 Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 511 
(1986). 
26 Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464 
(1986). 
27 Id. at 2473. 
28 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 
(1976). 
29 See Gershman, Why Prosecutors 
Misbehave, 22 Crim. L. Bull. 131 (1986). 
30 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 
(1935). 
31 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
See also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) 
(indigent defendant has no constitutional 
right to compel appointed counsel to argue 
on appeal all nonfrivolous points). 
33 
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with client perjury involve at-
torneys who are either public 
defenders, or court appointed. This 
is not to suggest that a poor defen-
dant has any greater right to commit 
perjury than a wealthy one, or that 
retained lawyers necessarily would 
tolerate client perjury more readily 
than lawyers paid by the state.32 Nor 
is it altogether clear that public 
defenders view the issue of client 
perjury differently than retained 
counsel. However, any attorney 
who feels that he has to justify to the 
court the correctness or effec-
tiveness of his representation, or is 
inclined to play the role of jury or 
judge, may, as the concurring opin-
ion in Nix warned, deprive his client 
of the zealous advocacy guaranteed 
by the Constitution. 
Finally, to the extent that Nix 
authorizes defense counsel to engage 
in conduct which effectively drives 
his client off the witness stand, it 
constitutes an insensitive and un-
warranted intrusion into a defend-
ant's right to testify in his own 
behalf. 33 Crucial to notions of 
civilized justice are concerns for a 
defendant's individual freedom and 
dignity. Such concerns ought to be 
respected, even at the risk of false 
testimony.34 Surely the abolition of 
common law rules of witness dis-
qualification did not imply that 
defendants thereafter would give 
only truthful testimony. Thus, 
shocking as it may seem to some, a 
defendant probably should be 
allowed to lie, even though he has 
no right to lie. The jury, not defense 
counsel, should be the safeguard 
against perjury. As Justices Brennan 
and Marshall observed: "The role of 
the defense lawyer should be above 
all to function as the instrument and 
defender of the client's autonomy 
and dignity in all phases of the 
criminal process."35 To be sure, a 
lawyer should not cooperate in his 
client's perjury, assist him in any 
manner, or use such testimony in 
argument to the jury. This is a far 
cry, however, from the conduct of 
the lawyer in Nix. He was function-
ing not as a defense counsel, but as a 
surrogate prosecutor. Simultaneous 
commitments to one's client, and to 
the cause of abstract justice, are in-
compatible. To the extent that bar 
codes and court decisions mandate 
such behavior, they demand from 
attorneys the impossible. If the 
defendant wishes to lie, the lawyer 
should sit back and let his client say 
what he wants to say. From a tac-
tical standpoint, this may be the 
worst possible scenario for a defend-
ant. But that is his choice. 36 Nothing 
in Nix v. Whiteside prevents state 
bar associations from enacting 
ethical rules consistent with this ap-
proach.37 
32 To be sure, privately retained counsel may 
raise the issue from a sincere belief in the 
ethical considerations. On the other hand, 
such counsel may raise the issue for tactical 
reasons, such as seeking a continuance, or 
engineering a mistrial. See, e.g., Lowery v. 
Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 731 n. 6 (9th Cir. 
1978); McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 
754 (5th Cir, 1967), aff'd after remand, 398 
F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968). 
33 See note 11, supra, 
34 G. HAZARD, note 1 supra at 127-135. 
35 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 763 (1983). 
36 Arguably, a lawyer standing mute and 
refraining from direct or redirect examina-
tion, and then failing to support the defend-
ant's testimony in closing argument, conveys 
to the jury a pretty clear signal as to defense 
counsel's view of 'the evidence. 
37 The Court stated: "When examining at-
torney conduct, a court must be careful not 
to narrow the wide range of conduct accept-
able under the Sixth Amendment so restric-
tively as to constitutionalize particular stan-
dards of professional conduct and thereby in-
trude into the State's proper authority to 
define and apply the standards of profes-
sional conduct applicable to those it admits to 
practice in its courts." 106 S. Ct. at 994. 
Justice Brennan similarly observed: "[Tlhe 
Court cannot tell the states or the lawyers in 
the states how to behave in their courts, 
unless or until federal rights are violated." [d, 
at 1000 (concurring opinion) (emphasis in 
original). 
Thus far, eleven states have adopted the 
ABA Model Rules. New York continues to 
follow the ABA Model Code. On November 
2, 1985, the House of Delegates of the New 
York State Bar Association rejected a resolu-
tion to recommend an amended version of 
the Model Rules. 
....... 
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